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Abstract 
This paper aims at providing a quantitative assessment of different proposals 
for reforming the Stability and Growth Pact by extending a counterfactual 
experiment performed in Eichengreen and Wyplosz (1998). Using estimated 
coefficients from a reduced form model, we simulate the path of the output 
gap for the largest Euro zone countries (France, Germany, Italy) after 
imposing limits to structural deficit according to different fiscal rules 
(structural deficit rules, golden rules and rules that incorporate the stock of 
debt). For each of these countries we can rank the different reform proposals 
in terms of output loss over the period considered.  
Our analysis has the merit of using a uniform method and hence allow a 
comparison across countries and across rules. The main results of the 
experiment, which emerge robustly, are (a), that the golden rule would be the 
most beneficial both using individual country's criteria and global criteria; 
and (b) that the status quo, the Maastricht rule, is less restrictive than many 
currently debated alternatives. 
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1.  Introduction 
The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) complements the Maastricht Treaty in defining the 
framework for fiscal policy in Europe1 . Very broadly speaking, it requires countries to 
maintain a fiscal position of close to balance or surplus over the cycle, and never to surpass 
the 3% deficit to GDP limit. 
The long slowdown, which begun in 2001, and the subsequent deterioration of public 
finances well beyond the 3% limit, has strengthened the debate on whether the SGP is an 
appropriate framework for fiscal policy in the European Union. The debate has involved 
academic circles and policy makers alike. Reform proposals aimed at avoiding some of its 
shortcomings flourished. After a meeting in October 2004, French President Jacques Chirac, 
and German Chancellor Gerard Schroeder joined the camp of those calling for modifications 
that would allow a more active fiscal policy. The leaders of the two largest European 
economies, which repeatedly surpassed the deficit ceiling in the past few years, pleaded for 
the exclusion of research and development expenditure from deficit figures (a version of the 
so called "golden rule")2.  
The present paper avoids entering into the debate on whether a Stability Pact is necessary, 
and focuses on the reform proposals that are currently on the floor. Our scope is to rank these 
proposals in terms of the growth performance for the three largest euro zone countries. To 
make such an assessment, we perform a dynamic simulation exercise in the spirit of 
Eichengreen and Wyplosz (1998). We first estimate a reduced form VAR model, and then use 
the coefficients to simulate output gap figures resulting from the use of different rules, had 
them been followed in the past. We draw conclusions on the appeal of underlying rules, for 
each country as well as for the countries as a whole, in terms of the output gain or loss 
generated by the corresponding public finance adjustment strategy. 
 This counterfactual experiment has of course to be evaluated with caution, being subject 
to a series of methodological weaknesses. Nevertheless, it allows a uniform comparison 
across rules and across countries. Furthermore, the main results of the analysis emerge quite 
robustly: the first is that the golden rule would be the most beneficial both for individual 
countries and applying global welfare criteria. Thus, our results may help explain the Franco-
German preference for such a rule. Overall, then, our results suggest that the current setup is 
not likely to be changed unless some kind of golden rule is proposed. 
 
The outline of the paper is as follows. The next section quickly reviews the institutional 
features of the Stability Pact, and summarizes the main criticisms that have been raised 
                                            
1 The SGP consists of Council regulations 1466/97 and 1467/97, and of a protocol annexed to the Amsterdam 
Treaty, signed in June 1997. 
2 "Paris and Berlin Seek Relaxation of Fiscal Rules", Financial Times, October 27, 2004 
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against it. Then, section 3 enumerates the main reform proposals that are intended to 
strengthen the Pact. The following section describes the counterfactual example we perform 
in this paper, which we borrow from Eichengreen and Wyplosz (1998); the section also 
addresses some criticisms to this methodology, and describes the data we use. Section 5 is the 
core of the paper, and presents the results of our simulation exercise, detailing for each reform 
proposal the deviation from the benchmark case. Section 6 discusses the ranking of the 
different rules that emerges from the experiment, taking both global and individual countries' 
perspectives; we also draw the political economy implications of such a ranking. Finally, 
section 7 ranks the rules according to an alternative measure of welfare, the unemployment 
performance; such a ranking substantially confirms the findings of section 6, acting as a 
robustness check for our experiment. 
 
2. The Stability Pact: Institutional Features and the Theoretical Debate. 
Countries joining the euro were in need for a set of rules aimed at permanently 
guaranteeing the soundness of fiscal policy. In fact, the criteria set by the Maastricht Treaty 
only represented a requirement for entry in the EMU, and nothing in principle prevented 
countries from abandoning fiscal discipline once admitted to the single currency club. The 
Amsterdam Treaty (1997), better known as the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) 
complements the Maastricht Treaty, in that its main objective is to make permanent the 
requirements for public finance soundness, and to increase transparency. According to the 
Treaty, each year member countries have to present a "Stability and Convergence 
Programme", to be examined by the European Commission and the Council. The programmes 
provide a medium-term objective for the budgetary position of close to balance or in surplus, 
together with the adjustment path towards the objective. Furthermore, the programmes give 
the main assumptions about expected economic developments together with description of 
budgetary and other economic policy measures being taken and/or proposed to achieve the 
objectives. 
The Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP), introduced with the Maastricht Treaty and better 
defined by the Stability Pact, states which deviations from the 3% budget deficit ceiling are 
acceptable, and gives the Council the right to sanction (by qualified majority) the countries 
not respecting it. The Treaty also stipulates that gross government debt should be maintained 
below 60% of GDP or, if higher, it should be “decreasing at a satisfactory pace”. However, 
when defining the operational content of the Treaty basic provisions, the SGP does not make 
any reference to the debt criterion. 
The EDP has first been invoked for Portugal (for the 2001 deficit). The Council decision to 
"forgive" France and Germany, in November 2003, triggered an unprecedented clash with the 
Commission, which had recommended that an Excessive Deficit Procedure be opened. The 
Commission sought a judgement by the European Court of Justice, which ruled against the 
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Council in July 2004. In the spring 2004 the Excessive Deficit Procedure was also invoked for 
the Netherlands, Greece, and a number of newly admitted countries. As of today (January 
2005), no country has been sanctioned yet. 
The increasing deterioration of budgetary positions in a number of countries, overcame the 
reluctance of European institutions to deal with the issue of reforming the SGP. The European 
Commission (2002) proposed a reinterpretation of the rules that introduced more flexibility in 
the medium-term deficit target but also a more restrictive definition of the fiscal objective: it 
was clearly stated that the medium-term target applies to the cyclically adjusted budget 
balance, thus allowing automatic stabilizers to operate over the cycle. However, the new 
interpretation also required countries with structural deficits to improve their structural budget 
position of at least 0.5% of GDP each year until the “close-to-balance or surplus” target has 
been reached. The rate of reduction of structural deficit should be even higher in countries 
with high deficit and debt. In the fall 2004 the Commission (2004) has further advanced in 
that direction. First, it proposes to explicitly consider debt sustainability in the assessment on 
budgetary positions, by taking into account implicit liabilities that may influence the debt 
long-run dynamics. Second, the Commission agrees to consider country-specific 
circumstances when defining medium-term objectives of “close to balance or in surplus”. 
Finally, it agrees to make more flexible the Excessive Deficit Procedure, by considering the 
budgetary impact of periods "of exceptionally weak economic growth" both when it identifies 
an ‘excessive deficit’ and when it emits the recommendations and deadlines to correct it.  
 
The Stability Pact is rooted in the idea that the interdependence that characterizes a 
currency area imposes some form of fiscal discipline. In extreme situations this view is 
unchallenged: reckless fiscal policy and "abnormal" budget deficits would spill over to the 
other countries in the area and impose costs on them via excessive interest rates and/or 
inflationary pressures.  But on the generalization of this principle to "normal times", and 
hence on the role of fiscal policy, there is much less agreement. The debate is all the more 
heated when considering that in a monetary union fiscal policy represents the only instrument 
left in the hands of governments to pursue their objectives. We do not tackle this issue here3, 
for essentially two reasons. The first is that our objective is not to assess whether the SGP is 
desirable or harmful per se, but rather to give a quantitative assessment of the different reform 
proposals. And the second is that, regardless of their positions on the broad issue, the vast 
majority of the economists think that the Stability Pact in its actual formulation is flawed. 
Before reviewing, in the next section, the main reform proposals, we summarize the flaws 
that have been highlighted in the literature.  
                                            
3  A good starting point, to look into the debate, is Brunila, Buti and Franco (2001). Two good taxonomies of 
the shortcomings of the Pact may be found in  Wyplosz (2002b) and Buti, Eijffinger and Franco (2003). 
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The first set of problems with the Pact has to do with its rigidity. The most serious 
shortcoming is the one-size-fits-all feature of the SGP. This comes from the institutional 
design, that requires the 3% limit (and the medium run close-to-balance position) to be 
observed by all countries; but also from the fact that other important variables, like the stock 
of public debt, the need for infrastructures or the population age structure, which greatly vary 
across countries have been overlooked in assessing the soundness of the fiscal position. Any 
sensible evaluation of the sustainability of public deficit should consider these parameters, 
and hence call for different constraints. 
Another important source of rigidity is that by focussing on annual budgets the SGP 
overlooks all the intertemporal issues linked to fiscal policy. These range from investment 
expenditures, whose return is spread over long periods (so that the same should hold for the 
cost), to the smoothing over different years of the adjustment costs linked to a downturn, or to 
current expenditures whose effects may be felt in the future (e.g. education). By imposing 
limits in terms of annual accounting, the SGP eliminates any intertemporal smoothing of 
fiscal policy. Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002) further argue that the lack of intertemporal 
structure of the Pact may even be harmful, by forcing governments to postpone structural 
reforms (namely of the pension system) that would yield benefits only in the medium-to-long 
run while imposing a short term burden on public finances (cuts in public system 
contributions in order to allow financing of private pension schemes). 
 
This points to a related problem with the current setup, namely its inconsistency. Actual 
practice has up to now completely ignored the few references to debt that were present in the 
treaties. Although the Maastricht 60% reference value for the debt ratio is arbitrary and 
theoretical unfounded, it serves as a basis for the deficit target via the steady-state debt 
accumulation equation4. Nevertheless, the SGP fails to take into account this link, neglecting 
to design sanctions and to explicitly define a numerical rule for the “satisfactory pace” of 
reduction in the debt ratio. Furthermore, the SGP does more than simply neglect debt 
criterion. By changing the deficit target from 3% to 0% it also redefines implicitly the long 
term debt target: a 60% debt-to-GDP ratio would be obtained with an average 3% deficit. The 
average balanced deficit imposed by the SGP would yield a debt-to-GDP ratio converging to 
zero5. 
 
                                            
4 The 3% target had been set on the basis of a rough calculation as the figure stabilizing the debt ratio at the 60% 
level, assuming a 5% increase in nominal GDP (3% of potential growth and 2% of inflation); if the GDP 
elasticity of deficit is 0.5 (the average EU value as calculated by the Commission), the limit would allow a 6% 
deviation from potential growth starting from a balanced structural budget. However, the 3%-60% rules are 
mutually consistent only if the 60% limit were to apply to net debt instead of gross debt. 
5 De Grauwe (2003) discusses at length this crucial but often unnoticed change of perspective from the 
Maastricht Treaty,  to the zero debt target imposed by the SGP. 
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The third major shortcoming is the lack of credibility of the Pact and of the system of 
sanctions it proposes. Sanctions are tough (up to 0.5% of GDP) and delayed (in any case they 
are never imposed before the third year from the infraction). Furthermore they are decided by 
the Council, a body in which political motivation and technical assessments are inextricably 
linked, thus giving rise to closed door negotiations where 'anything goes'. No wonder that the 
SGP is perceived as non enforceable and non credible by the markets whose judgement 
focuses on long term sustainability issues that the Pact neglects. As a consequence in 
Germany and in France, both interest rates and public sector bond ratings do not seem to have 
reacted negatively to the breaking of the limit, nor to the dispute with the Commission that 
followed in the winter of 2003.  
Another flaw of the Pact is the possibility that it forces EMU countries to conduct 
procyclical policies in downturn. Germany, struggling to reduce expenditure and to raise 
taxes on the brink of a recession, is a case in point. In theory, the SGP had been designed to 
provide enough flexibility, i.e. to provide the room for automatic stabilizers to play. The 
architects of the pact had nevertheless failed to consider two aspects: the first, as predicted by 
Eichengreen and Wyplosz ((1998); hereafter EW),  is that, during the transition to the 'close to 
balance' position, countries would not be able to stabilize their economies if hit by a negative 
shock, a prediction that the downturn begun in 2001 proved correct6. The problems posed by 
the transition become even more evident if we consider that the starting point was, for most of 
the countries involved, a situation of high unemployment and low growth. The second and 
even more serious problem is the assumption that only automatic stabilization would be 
required and desirable. In fact, even at cruising speed, the Pact would limit any discretionary 
fiscal policy, thus potentially depriving democratically elected governments of the only tool 
left for carrying out their contract with the electorate7. Thus, whatever the initial intentions 
may have been, the SGP has constrained euro area countries to neutral, when not explicitly 
procyclical, fiscal policies. The rigidity imposed by the SGP during the downturn has a 
number of side effects: the blossoming of creative accounting practices that have further 
contributed to weaken the institutional credibility of the system; the reduction of "invisible" 
but crucial expenditures (like education, basic research, and investment), while unproductive 
but politically sensitive expenditures have not been touched.  
 
Finally, the design of the pact is asymmetric, and contains no incentive to behave properly 
in good times: "the problem, with the Pact as presently framed is that it is all stick and no 
                                            
6 Buti and Sapir (2002) show that the largest countries of the euro area (France, Germany, Italy) did not use 
the slack given by the expansion of 1997-2000 to consolidate their budget. This finding may be seen as a proof 
that "the problem does not lie with the pact", but rather in the inappropriate policies of governments. These 
misbehaviours nevertheless were predictable, and should have been taken care of when designing an architecture 
whose main objective was precisely to avoid them. This points to the issue of the asymmetry of the SGP. 
7 Fitoussi (2002) deals at length with the democratic deficit of Europe’s “economic government”. 
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carrot; rewarding good fiscal behaviour in booms rather than, or in addition to, punishing bad 
behaviour in slumps, would surely make better sense" (Bean (1998)). Indeed, nothing in the 
SGP prevents countries from running pro-cyclical fiscal policies in good times, i.e. when 
experiencing above trend growth (Buti and Giudice (2002)). 
 
To sum up, the SGP in its actual formulation lacks the flexibility required to respond to 
specific shocks (in a sentence: "too much stability, if any, and too little growth"); it is 
asymmetric, providing no incentive to reduce expenses or to increase revenues during strong 
growth; it has excessive uniformity of rules, notably between mature and catching-up 
countries, regardless of the rate and variability of growth, of investment needs, of contingent 
liabilities and of sustainability of public finances; it disregards the growth (and public 
investment) inter-temporal features; finally, it apparently neglects the long term sustainability 
of public finances, while in practice imposing a common and theoretically unwarranted rule 
of public debt dramatic reduction. All these shortcomings are visible, and require intervention, 
regardless of the general opinion one may have on the need for a rule constraining fiscal 
policy. 
In the next section we will briefly review the suggestions for reforms aimed at mitigating 
or to eliminating these flaws of the Pact. As our scope is to give a quantitative assessment in 
terms of growth, we will not deal with 'qualitative' proposals8.  
 
 
3. The Reform Proposals: Which Rule for Which Kind of Nuisance? 
The SGP has been under increasing pressure since fiscal positions of EMU countries 
deteriorated with the 2001 cyclical downturn. Proposals for revising the criteria of the SGP 
have multiplied at the same pace as criticisms of the current framework. In this section we 
briefly review the proposals that will be subject to evaluation in the following pages. We will 
recall how alternative fiscal rules stand up to the main criticisms that have been addressed to 
the present SGP setting, and then assess them by reference to criteria embodying the 
necessary characteristics of a good fiscal rule9: operational simplicity; flexibility in order to 
mitigate the effect of exogenous shocks; consistency with the goals of fiscal prudence and of 
preservation of the growth objective; enforceability by clear definition of objectives, escape 
clauses and penalties in order to reduce discretion; respect of national sovereignty and 
subsidiarity. 
                                            
8 In particular, there has been a large debate on a proposal, set forth by Wyplosz (2002a) on the creation of  
national independent budget authorities that should set the deficit targets. 
9 Kopits and Symansky (1998) enumerate the characteristics of "good" fiscal rules. Buti, Eijffinger and 
Franco (2003) assess the current European setup against these criteria and conclude that it does not perform 
badly, the only serious shortcoming being the scarce enforceability, and the lack of incentives to structural 
reforms. 
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The Balanced structural budget 
In September 2002 Pedro Solbes, then European Commissioner for Economic and 
Financial Affairs, officially admitted what all observers had already realised since the 
beginning of the year. That is, the objective of a balanced budget in 2004, confirmed at the 
European Council in Barcelona in March 2002, was no longer attainable, even in terms of 
structural balance, and was thus postponed to 2006. But short-term softening was coupled 
with a more restrictive definition of the fiscal objective. The required balance was stated in 
terms of structural deficit and a yearly reduction of 0.5 points in the cyclically adjusted 
balance until 2006 was required for countries with structural budget deficits in 2002. 
According to the European Commission the cyclical component of the budget only played a 
marginal role in explaining the deterioration of the budget positions in the euro zone in 2001 
and 2002, while being the major source of higher deficits in 2003. 
The Commission proposal had a serious shortcoming: eight countries in the euro zone 
recorded a budget deficit in 2002 and 2003 in both nominal and structural terms (the latter 
higher than or close to 2%). Thus the latest Commission’s requirement, by forcing the 
structural budget to balance by 2006, would have imposed a pro-cyclical stance to the euro 
zone. However, leaving aside the problems linked to the transition phase, the main advantage 
of a shift to structural deficit rules would be the increased flexibility in dealing with cyclical 
stabilization. In particular such a rule would never prevent automatic stabilizers from 
operating. On the other hand, the operational simplicity would be greatly reduced, by the 
reference to controversial magnitudes of the variables used in calculating the structural budget 
balance, such as the output gap and the NAIRU.  
 
The golden rule 
 The most widely discussed option to modify the Pact is based on the double budget 
approach, according to which the budget is split into a balanced current account and a deficit-
financed capital account. The golden rule, by drawing a distinction between current and 
capital spending is conceived with the intent of removing the bias against capital spending, 
thus shifting attention from a mere quantitative target to the quality of public finance. Since a 
higher public investment is supposed to increase the potential growth rate of the economy, 
notably for less mature countries, the golden rule is more compatible with growth and 
catching-up than the present SGP setting. It allows countries to spread the cost of durables 
over all the financial years in which they will be in use, and the burden of capital over the 
generations of taxpayers benefiting from it 10 . Moreover this rule implies debt-to-GDP 
                                            
10 In this spirit, the rule must apply to net investment and capital depreciation must be accounted for as 
current spending. 
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convergence to the ratio of public capital to GDP, rather than to the unwarranted level of 0% 
(Blanchard and Giavazzi (2004)) 
Those who reject the dual budget approach usually motivate their opposition by stressing 
fiscal soundness, since softening restrictions to current spending can be an obstacle to deficit 
and debt reduction (Calmfors and Corsetti (2003), Buti, Eijffinger and Franco (2003)). 
Furthermore, the golden rule implies that the rate of borrowing for investment is independent 
of the inflation rate and of the rate of growth of the economy (Buiter and Grafe (2004)). 
However, Creel (2003) argues that a golden rule would have endogenous discipline 
mechanisms: the interest payment expansion generated by public capital accumulation would 
impose a constraint to current expenditure growth, and hence at a certain point prevent further 
capital accumulation. Other criticisms concern the applicability of the rule and the difficulty 
to come up with a commonly agreed estimate of public net investment that would induce 
governments to resort to creative accounting in order to classify some current expenditure as 
investment spending11.  
As to the need for a rule in support of public investment, there is no clear-cut evidence that 
the SGP and fiscal consolidation had a crowding-out effect on public investment. The average 
rate of growth of gross public investment in the euro zone during the 1990s (2.8%) is only 
slightly lower than the average recorded in the previous three decades (3.5%). Furthermore, 
the decrease was not limited to the countries constrained by the treaty (Gali and Perotti 
(2003)). Accordingly, critics of this approach argue that, if the golden rule does not respond to 
an effective investment need, it may favour projects that are not necessarily profitable or 
worthwhile. They add that if the euro zone lacks infrastructure, a response at the supranational 
level through the common budget may be more efficient. Moreover, it is argued, are we sure 
that it is more efficient for future generations to inherit a higher stock of public capital rather 
than a lower stock of liabilities, which would allow them to react to their future needs more 
appropriately (Buti, Eijffinger and Franco (2003))? And, are we sure that physical capital is 
more beneficial to growth than other growth-friendly spending, such as education and health, 
improving human capital (Balassone and Franco (2001)? 
Finally, the golden rule may present the major shortcoming of being as cyclically inflexible 
as the present rule. The issue of cyclical effects, however, can be addressed by a structural 
version of the rule.  
 
The debt criterion 
Shifting the focus from deficit to debt addresses both the issue of long term sustainability 
and of the excessive uniformity of rules. Higher growth and inflation rates in catching-up 
countries, allow them to run higher deficits without jeopardizing the sustainability of public 
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finances. Mature countries with sound public finances may afford stronger stabilisation, that 
is, greater scope for discretionary fiscal policy, than that allowed by automatic stabilisers in 
order to face asymmetric shocks. Moreover, we saw that the present setting implicitly imposes 
an unwarranted 0% debt ratio target. Most of the proposals to take into account debt require 
abandoning numerical rules in favour of discretionary general assessments of public finance 
soundness. Wyplosz (2002a), Pisani-Ferry (2002) and Coeuré and Pisani-Ferry (2003) all 
share this approach, even if their proposals differ. We discussed them at length in Saraceno 
and Monperrus-Veroni (2004). In general these proposals have the advantage of increased 
flexibility (fiscal sustainability is assessed on a country-by-country basis), but they do not 
meet the requirement of operational simplicity, in that the deficit target is not automatically 
displayed. Furthermore, the assessment of fiscal sustainability is quite arbitrary, and would 
likely lead to quarrels and disputes among countries and with the Commission. If, as proposed, 
countries also have to take into account implicit liabilities, the rule becomes even less simple 
and transparent.  
An alternative proposal, put forth by Calmfors and Corsetti (2003) and the European 
Economic Advisory Group (EEAG, (2003)) is to impose a ladder of different deficit targets 
for different debt intervals (as shown in table 1). This ladder, where increases in the deficit 
ceiling for low-debt countries are matched by a reduction for high-debt countries, does not 
appear to be easily enforceable and therefore politically realistic. 
 
Table 1: Possible ways of conditioning the deficit ceiling on the debt ratio.  
Calmfors and Corsetti (2003) Economic Advisory Group (2003)  
Debt ratio  
 
Deficit ceiling 
 
Debt ratio  
 
Deficit ceiling 
 
Countries in the range 
(debt) 
>105 0.5 Italy (106.2) 
95-105 1.0 Greece (103), Belgium 
(100.5) 
85-95 1.5  
75-85 2.0  
65-75 2.5 Austria (65) 
>55 3.0 
55-65 3.0 Germany (64.2), France 
(63), Portugal (59.4),  
     
45-55 3.5 45-55 3.5 Netherlands (54.8), 
Sweden (51.8), Spain 
(50.8); Finland (45.3) 
     
35-45 4.0 35-45 4.0 Denmark (45), UK (39.8) 
25-35 4.5 25-35 4.5 Ireland (32) 
<25 5.0 <25 5.0 Luxembourg (4.9) 
     
Source: Public Finances in EMU-2003. All figures in percentage of GDP 
 
                                                                                                                                        
11 Setting the boundaries of public investment carries strong policy implications, as such a definition may 
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The asymmetric bias of the SGP is reduced by these proposals, since discipline and fiscal 
restraint are rewarded by increased room of manoeuvre and hence scope for stabilization in 
downturns. On the other hand, the proposed thresholds further introduce arbitrariness and 
complexity in the design of the rule.  
 
If debt has to be taken into account, it is possible to design a rule, simple and automatic, that 
reduces the risks of arbitrariness and is symmetric (Saraceno and Monperrus-Veroni (2004)). 
We suggested weighing the deficit target with “relative debt”, i.e. the ratio between the 60% 
Maastricht debt parameter and the country’s actual gross debt in term of GDP. The deficit 
target would thus be computed as 
 
1
0.6i
t ti
t
d d
b −
= , 
where di  and bi are deficit and debt of country i respectively, and d is the union wide target. 
Table 2 shows what the target would have to be, at the 2003 debt levels, in the two cases of an 
union wide target of 3% and 4%. 
  
Table 2: Deficit ceilings weighed by relative debt ratios 
 Weighted deficit  Weighted deficit 
 
Debt (2003) 
(a) (b)  
Debt (2003) 
(a) (b) 
Luxembourg 4.9 36.7 65.3 Portugal 59.4 3.0 5.4 
Ireland 32 5.6 10.0 France 63 2.9 5.1 
United Kingdom 39.8 4.5 8.0 Germany 64.2 2.8 5.0 
Denmark 45 4.0 7.1 Austria 65 2.8 4.9 
Finland 45.3 4.0 7.1 Belgium 100.5 1.8 3.2 
Spain 50.8 3.5 6.3 Greece 103 1.7 3.1 
Sweden 51.8 3.5 6.2 Italy 106.2 1.7 3.0 
Netherlands 54.8 3.3 5.8         
Source: Saraceno and Monperrus-Veroni (2004). All figures in percentage of GDP 
Column (a) takes union wide deficit target of 3%. Column (b) takes a union wide deficit target of 4% (and 
coherently, a debt ratio target of 80%).  
 
The advantage of this proposal lays in its operational simplicity, in the total absence of 
discretion (once we take for given the Maastricht parameters) in setting the deficit ceiling and 
in the creation of rewards for fiscal discipline. In fact, governments are encouraged to be 
virtuous in good times, in order to gain leeway for stabilization in bad times. Thus our proposal, 
while yielding similar dynamics (see Saraceno and Monperrus-Veroni (2004)), has more 
appealing properties than the others. On the other hand, the incentive to run down debt is a 
medium-long term one and does not affect the short term perspective of incumbent 
governments which could stop their consolidation effort just below the 3% (or 4%) limit and 
                                                                                                                                        
become the tool used by the Commission to impose its priorities in terms of expenditures. 
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run up into difficulties at the first recession anyhow. Another shortcoming could be its weak 
viability due to political vetoes which may com from high-debt countries12.  
 
 
4. Description of Data and Methodology  
To give a quantitative assessment of the reform proposals described above we follow the 
approach of Eichengreen and Wyplosz. They develop a counterfactual experiment, asking 
what consequences would the SGP have had, in terms of growth, had it been applied since the 
early 1960s. Such an experiment has many shortcomings, acknowledged by the authors 
themselves. The main one is that it represents a typical Lucas' Critique victim: were the pact 
applied in the past, agents would have embedded its consequences in their behaviour that 
would have been different. Actual data hence have a limited explaining power when trying to 
quantify the effects of alternative policies or, as in our case, institutions. The paper by 
Eichengreen and Wyplosz nevertheless retained a remarkable interest because it gave a 
measure of the magnitude of costs and benefits of the Pact. Furthermore, in our framework the 
Critique could be less problematic because we are interested in the relative performance of the 
different rules rather than in the absolute figures.  Eichengreen and Wyplosz do the following: 
(1) estimate the reduced form of a standard model, specifically a two-equations VAR with 
output gap and inflation changes as endogenous. Among the exogenous variables, they 
introduce the fiscal impulse (that they define as the change in structural deficit). (2) Then, 
they use the estimated coefficients and an artificial series for the fiscal impulse (derived by 
capping total deficit at 3% for each period in which it surpassed the threshold) to build the 
simulated series for output gap and inflation. (3) The simulated output gap series is finally 
compared to the actual one, to compute the difference in output. 
We use a similar procedure to rank the different reform proposals that we discussed. This 
is done by simulating fiscal adjustment strategies that would result from the enforcement of 
each of the fiscal rules. In doing so we focus on rules that are operationally simple and do not 
imply institutional reform. The following rules are tested:  
• the Maastricht 3% ceiling to nominal budget balance ( 0.03s ≥ −  where s is the nominal 
budget balance/GDP ratio); 
• the balanced structural budget rule ( 0ss ≥ , where ss is the cyclically adjusted 
budget/GDP ratio); 
• the structural deficit reduction at a constant rate of 0.5 point of GDP 
( ( ) ( )1 0.05s ss t s t= − +  if ( )1 0ss t − < ); 
                                            
12 In fact the 4% case would ensure political feasibility as the highest debt country, Italy, would have a deficit 
target of 3%, equivalent to the current one. 
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• the structural deficit convergence from its 1990 level to balance in 1998 
( ( ) ( )1s ss t s t x= − + , where x is the yearly average reduction rate in ss ); 
• the “nominal” golden rule ( )0 0.03s I kδ+ − ≥ − , where I  is the gross public 
investment/GDP ratio, 0k  is the public capital stock/GDP ratio at the end of the previous 
period  that is assumed to depreciate at a rate δ  
• the “structural” golden rule ( )0 0ss I kδ+ − ≥ ; 
• the cyclically adjusted budget/GDP ratio allowing for gross debt convergence (where the 
nominal primary balance/GDP ratio is computed as ( )0ps d r g x− − = , and x is the yearly 
debt reduction in percentage of GDP). We assume that the rule required debt/GDP ratio to 
decrease from its level in 1990 to the Maastricht limit of 60% in 1998, to remain at that 
level afterwards;  
• the relative debt rule ( 0.60.03s
d
≥ − ⋅ ). 
Data come from the OECD Economic Outlook, 74, December 2003 issue. Our analysis 
focuses on the three main countries of continental Europe, which, by joining the monetary 
union, fully accepted the institutional setup designed by the Maastricht and Amsterdam 
treaties. 1973 is the first year commonly available for the three countries concerned. We use 
the output gap calculated by the OECD according to the production function approach; 
inflation is obtained as a change in the Consumer Price Index; nominal budget balances are 
government net lending net of UMTS receipts; and net investment is computed by using the 
government consumption of public capital as depreciation. The structural deficit (surplus), 
consistent with an output gap calculated with the production function approach, is provided 
by the OECD. 
 
The next section presents the results of our simulation exercise. We begin by estimating, 
for our dataset, the same reduced form estimated by EW. Then, we use the estimated 
coefficients to simulate the path of output and inflation corresponding to the fiscal adjustment 
paths consistent with the different rules. Each artificial fiscal impulse series is the change in 
the cyclically adjusted deficit that we would observe were the rule followed. 
The artificial fiscal impulse series used in our counterfactual experiment is the simulated 
change in the cyclically adjusted deficit corresponding to the fiscal adjustment paths 
consistent with the different rules to be tested. Thus, for rules constraining nominal balances, 
such as the Maastricht rule, the nominal golden rule and the relative debt rule rules, we have 
to compute the corresponding change in cyclically adjusted terms. We start from the 
hypothesis that a change in the fiscal adjustment path in t-1 influences growth and the output 
gap in t and that this change in the output gap has only an effect on the cyclical component of 
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the budget balance without affecting its structural component in the short term. We then 
calculate the new nominal budget balance in t adding to the original, unchanged structural 
budget balance the new cyclical component. The new cyclical component in t is obtained by 
applying the government budget elasticity to cyclical variations in economic activity 
calculated by the OECD (van den Noord, 2000) to the simulated output gap in t-1, consistent 
with the fiscal adjustment strategy implemented. Then, the nominal budget balance, thus 
obtained, is constrained according to the rule and adjusted for the cycle. 
For fiscal adjustment strategies that result from rules constraining structural deficit, such as 
the structural balanced budget, structural balance convergence, the half point structural deficit 
reduction, the structural balance allowing for debt convergence and the structural golden rule, 
the original structural deficit is directly constrained.  
Our procedure allows to render the output gap endogenous as a resultant of the 
implementation of different rules; in doing so, we respond to some of the criticisms addressed 
to the EW paper (e.g., Bean (1998)). 
 
 
5. The Results 
 
5.1 The Reduced Form Estimation 
Table 3 shows the results of the reduced form estimation corresponding to table 8 in EW. 
 
Table 3. Reduced form estimates  
 France Germany Italy 
 
Output 
Gap 
∆ 
Inflation  
Output 
Gap 
∆ 
Inflation  
Output 
Gap 
∆ 
Inflation 
Output 
Gap(-1) 
0.952 
(8.71) 
0.688 
(3.16) 
 0.828 
(10.6) 
0.113 
(1.40) 
 0.672 
(6.52) 
0.758 
(1.62) 
∆ 
Inflation(-1) 
-0.175 
(-2.11) 
-0.308 
(-1.87) 
 -0.270 
(-1.92) 
-0.324 
(-1.96) 
 -0.01 
(0.44) 
-0.377 
(-2.37) 
Fiscal 
Impulse 
-0.382 
(-1.31) 
0.935 
(1.61) 
 -0.446 
(-1.92) 
0.029 
(0.122) 
 -0.318 
(-2.40) 
-0.73 
(-1.23) 
         
R2 0.720 0.495  0.794 0.14  0.646 0.194 
Obs. 24   32   38  
Data: OECD.  t-statistics in parentheses. 
Fiscal impulse is defined as the change in cyclically adjusted total budget deficit. For France and Italy it is retarded one 
period. 
Following EW, we also used country specific dummies to improve the estimation fit. The coefficients are not reported 
 
Our data set, in spite of revised figures for the output gap and the structural adjusted 
budget, yields the same qualitative behaviour. The effect of the fiscal impulse on the output 
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gap is in all cases lower than in EW13, but only for France remarkably so. The coefficients for 
inflation are in line with those of EW, and as in their work the explanatory power of the 
regression is quite low14.  
 
5.2 The Maastricht rule. 
The coefficients for the output gap in table 3 will be first used to evaluate what would the 
Maastricht Treaty have given in term of output gain or loss, were it in place since the early 
1970s. We ran a dynamic simulation in which the fiscal impulse series was recomputed by 
imposing a 3% ceiling to nominal deficit. We then compared the results with those of the 
same simulation, obtained by using the actual values of the fiscal impulse (our "benchmark"). 
We could have used the actual values for the output gap and inflation, but then the difference 
with the simulated series would have also captured all the noise coming from the imperfect fit 
of the regression. By using simulated series as benchmark, we gain in coherence and 
homogeneity of the results. Table 4 reports for each of the three countries the average yearly 
output loss. 
 
Table 4. Counterfactual: Maastricht rule  
 France Germany Italy 
 Simulated Benchmark Simulated Benchmark Simulated Benchmark 
       
Output gap       
1973-2002 -0.42 0.12 1.57 1.57 -1.01 -0.98 
1990-2002 -1.19 -0.79 1.95 1.82 -1.35 -1.22 
       
∆ Inflation       
1973-2002 -0.23 0.01 0.21 0.21 -0.39 -0.37 
1990-2002 -0.34 -0.18 0.19 0.18 -1.10 -0.99 
Average yearly values. 
 
The simulation shows that the Maastricht rule, when applied since the early seventies, 
would have been more constraining than the actual self-imposed discipline in France, (0.54 
points of GDP of average loss), preventing the country from cumulating high deficits during 
the 1992-95 period. In Italy, the Maastricht rule would have been only slightly more 
restrictive, since the excessively expansionary stance during the second half of the 1980 and 
early 1990s forced it to put in place counterbalancing restrictive policies in the run-up to the 
euro. In Germany it would have been the same as expected, since the German public deficit 
                                            
13 The EW coefficients for fiscal impulse, in the output gap equation, are: -0.68 (France), -0.58 (Germany), 
and -0.43 (Italy). We thank C. Wyplosz who by providing us with his dataset allowed us to find a typo and to 
easily carry out the comparison between our dataset and his own. 
14 Notice that in these reduced form estimates we consider each country in isolation. In particular, we 
overlook spill-over effects of fiscal impulses. In fact, we chose to focus on the simplest possible reduced forms 
(as EW do) in order to highlight the direct effects of fiscal impulses. 
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rarely attained or violated the 3% limit in the period concerned (with the recent exception of 
the 2002-2004 period). The sub-period 1990-2002 provides the same result for France and 
Italy and more expansionary in Germany, preventing the building up of the deficit in 1991 
and 1995 and thus the subsequent fiscal restriction in the years from 1997 to 1999.  In Italy 
the respect of the 3% limit from 1990 would have entailed a slightly more restrictive fiscal 
stance, since it would have avoided the rise in the deficit which still took place at the 
beginning of the 1990s. The strong consolidation required during the first year of 
implementation of the Maastricht rule in our simulation would have been somewhat more 
significant than the actual cumulated fiscal restriction effectively carried out during the whole 
decade.  
 
 
5.3 Balanced Structural Budget 
The same exercise is now performed using a balanced structural budget rule. We capped to 
zero the cyclically adjusted deficit, while still allowing for structural surpluses when they 
occurred. Table 5 reports the results. 
 
Table 5. Counterfactual: Balanced structural budget rule  
 France Germany Italy 
 Simulated Benchmark Simulated Benchmark Simulated Benchmark 
       
Output gap       
1973-2002 -0.31 0.12 1.65 1.57 -1.09 -0.98 
1990-2002 -1.80 -0.79 1.46 1.82 -1.52 -1.22 
       
∆ Inflation       
1973-2002 -0.19 0.01 0.21 0.21 -0.48 -0.37 
1990-2002 -0.64 -0.18 0.15 0.18 -1.31 -0.99 
Average yearly values. 
 
For the longer period, the results are quite similar to the ones produced by the Maastricht 
rule, with an average yearly output loss larger than the benchmark for France and slightly 
larger in Italy, and a somewhat more expansionary fiscal stance for Germany. As a matter of 
fact deterioration of the structural budget balance in the mid-1990s in France was only 
partially counterbalanced by further improvement; in Italy structural budget improvement 
during the three decades amounted to the same strong consolidation that would have been 
required in order to lower the structural deficit from the initial level of 8.3% to balance during 
the first year of implementation of the balanced structural budget rule. However were this rule 
applied from 1990 the results would have been less expansionary than the benchmark for 
Germany and more restrictive for France and Italy that started in 1990 from a higher structural 
deficit, thus requiring a stronger consolidation in a shorter time span to attend the structural 
  18
balance. The outcome in all three countries is also more restrictive than the one generated by 
the Maastricht rule since both the actual structural deficit and the one allowed by the 3% 
ceiling, where in 2002 still above the 0% limit.  
 
 
5.4 Structural balance convergence 
Next we performed a somewhat different exercise, by imposing convergence of the 
cyclically adjusted budget from its actual level in 1990 to zero in the pre-accession year 
(1998). We assumed the convergence process to take place at a constant yearly rate (equal to 
1.6%, 0.4%, and 0.3% respectively for Italy, Germany, and France). From 1998 onwards, the 
structural budget is supposed to remain balanced in all countries 
 
Table 6. Counterfactual: Structural budget converging to balance from 1990 to 1998
 France Germany Italy 
 Simulated Benchmark Simulated Benchmark Simulated Benchmark 
       
Output gap       
1990-2002 -0.77 -0.79 1.44 1.82 -1.39 -1.22 
       
∆ Inflation         
1990-2002 -0.10 -0.18 0.05 0.18 -1.20 -0.99 
Average yearly values. 
 
Table 6 shows that output loss is larger than in the benchmark figures in Italy and less 
expansionary for Germany, whereas for France it is not significantly different. This result is 
rather intuitive since both countries started the decade with high structural deficits (12.4% and 
4.5% respectively in 1990), thus requiring stronger convergence than for France, which 
cumulated higher structural imbalances later on during the decade, but showed an initial lower 
cyclically adjusted deficit (2.8%). As expected, the rule proves less restrictive than the simple 
balanced budget rule, and more restrictive than the Maastricht rule.  
 
 
5.5 A half point yearly structural deficit reduction  
In table 7 we suppose that countries had to fulfil, starting in 1990, the European 
Commission’s September 2002 requirement of a yearly 0.5 point reduction in the cyclically 
adjusted deficit.  
Intuitively, results in terms of output prove more restrictive for France and less 
expansionary for Germany than the effective fiscal stance. A lower loss in cumulated output 
appears however in Italy, where the consolidation process, especially in earlier years of the 
decade, has been much stronger. As compared to the rule imposing convergence to a balanced 
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structural budget at the eve of the EMU (paragraph 5.4) the pace of structural deficit reduction 
is much lower for Italy, slightly higher for France and the same for Germany. The resulting 
output loss is therefore less important for Italy which would have still showed a 6% structural 
deficit in 2002 and more significant in France, where a balanced structural budget would have 
been reached as early as 1994. Except for the Italian case, this rule proves more restrictive 
than the 3% Maastricht ceiling. 
 
Table 7. Counterfactual: A half point yearly structural deficit  reduction 
 France Germany Italy 
 Simulated Benchmark Simulated Benchmark Simulated Benchmark
       
Output gap       
1990-2002 -1.37 -0.79 1.44 1.82 -0.87 -1.22 
       
∆ Inflation        
1990-2002 -0.38 -0.18 0.15 0.18 -0.65 -0.99 
Average yearly values. 
 
 
5.6 The Golden Rule  
We ask what the effects would be in term of output growth had a golden rule been applied 
since 1990. The golden rule is obtained by applying the 3% Maastricht ceiling to the current 
budget balance, that is, the budget balance excluding investment net of depreciation. To avoid 
taking into account the potential effects of consolidation on the pace of capital accumulation 
in the past fifteen years, the average value of net investment in the three previous decades is 
used to reproduce investment behaviour in the nineties which would have been unconstrained 
in the counterfactual. Thus, the artificial series for structural deficit is obtained by summing 
the actual current balance capped at 3% and the past average investment expenditure, and then 
adjusting for the cycle. 
  
Table 8. Counterfactual: Nominal golden rule 
 France Germany Italy 
 Simulated Benchmark Simulated Benchmark Simulated Benchmark 
       
Output gap       
1990-2002 -0.14 -0.79 2.27 1.82 -0.97 -1.22 
       
∆ Inflation       
1990-2002 -0.33 -0.69 0.20 0.21 -0.02 -0.99 
Average yearly values     
 
The impact on the output gap is the one expected: a lower output loss for France and Italy, 
a gain for Germany. The latter is due to the more expansionary fiscal policy that this rule 
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would have allowed in Germany, compared to the effective fiscal stance, which has implicitly 
respected a 3% ceiling during the decade. In the case of France the fiscal stance permitted by 
the golden rule is roughly more expansionary than the effective one, since, contrary to 
Germany, France’s deficit was maintained above 3% on average during the decade. In the 
case of Italy, imposing a golden rule since the beginning of the nineties would have avoided 
further building up of the deficit and consequently severe consolidation at the eve of the EMU. 
The cumulated loss of output would then have been lower, but a rigorous fiscal stance would 
have anyhow been imposed during the first year of implementation of the new fiscal regime. 
Thus the nominal golden rule proves slightly less restrictive (more expansionary in the case of 
Germany) not only compared to the effective fiscal stance but also to the Maastricht criterion. 
A structural version of the golden rule, like the one currently implemented in the United 
Kingdom, would have the advantage of increased flexibility, and we wonder what would the 
growth outcome be, had it been applied since 1990. The artificial series is obtained by 
applying the 0% ceiling to the current cyclically adjusted budget balance, and then allowing 
for investment. As before, the average value of net investment in the three previous decades is 
used to reproduce investment behaviour in the nineties. 
 
Table 9. Counterfactual: Structural golden rule 
 France Germany Italy 
 Simulated Benchmark Simulated Benchmark Simulated Benchmark 
       
Output gap       
1990-2002 -0.63 -0.79 1.88 1.82 -1.14 -1.22 
       
∆ Inflation       
1990-2002 -0.18 -0.18 0.18 0.18 -0.91 -0.99 
Average Yearly Values     
 
Rather intuitively results relatively to effective output are quite similar to the ones 
stemming from the nominal golden rule, showing a more restrictive stance for Italy and for 
France, and a less expansionary one for Germany, than the nominal golden rule. In all cases 
the nominal golden rule would have allowed countries to run a structural deficit larger than 
the limit of around 1,5% permitted by the structural golden rule. France and Italy would have 
benefited from a lower loss in output than in the case the Maastricht criteria had been applied. 
On the contrary, for Germany the output gain would have been lower.  
 
5.7 Cyclically adjusted budget allowing for gross debt convergence  
The artificial series of structural budget used in the counterfactual exercise of table 10 is 
obtained by imposing convergence of the gross debt to GDP ratio from its 1990 level to 60% 
in the pre-accession year (1998). The convergence process takes place at a constant yearly 
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rate and the budget balance is endogenous. Given initial debt levels, the rule can be studied 
for Italy only. 
 
Table 10. Counterfactual. Debt converging to 60% in 1998. 
 Italy 
 Simulated Benchmark  
    
Output gap    
1990-2002 -1.33 -1.22  
    
∆ Inflation    
1990-2002 -1.07 -0.99  
Average yearly values. 
 
Its consequences in term of output loss are quite similar to the Maastricht case. Curbing 
down the path of debt accumulation would have required a stronger improvement of the 
nominal and structural budget balance (a 2% deficit would have been allowed on average over 
the 1990-2002 period), especially in the earliest years of the decade, when the effective debt 
ratio continued to rise.  
 
5.8 Budget Balance as a Function of Relative Debt  
In Saraceno and Monperrus-Veroni (2004) we propose to modify the Maastricht rule by 
modulating it symmetrically according to the country’s relative debt position. The 3% limit is 
multiplied by the ratio between 60% (the debt criterion) and the actual country’s debt ratio. 
For highly indebted countries the rule hardens the Maastricht parameter, while a looser rule 
applies to countries with debt ratios below 60%. The debt is thus endogenously determined as 
a function of constrained deficit.  
 
Table 11. Relative debt rule 
 France Germany Italy 
 Simulated Benchmark Simulated Benchmark Simulated Benchmark 
       
Output gap       
1990-2002 -0.27 -0.79 1.74 1.82 -1.29 -1.22 
       
∆ Inflation       
1990-2002 0.05 -0.18 0.08 0.18 -1.06 -0.99 
Average Yearly Values     
 
 
The rule proves less expansionary than the self-imposed discipline for Germany less 
restrictive for France and more restrictive for Italy, where, actual consolidation has been 
weaker than the one required were this rule in place during the nineties. For Italy the rule 
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would have allowed an average deficit of 2.3% during the decade (compared to the effective 
average of 6.4%), since the debt  to GDP ratio, constantly higher than 60%, implied that the 
country was not even allowed to reach the 3% Maastricht ceiling. For France a lower starting 
debt to GDP ratio than Germany allowed a higher deficit ceiling (3.1% on average in France 
and 2.6% in Germany) at the beginning of the decade.  
 
 
6. The Ranking of Alternative Reform Proposals 
We saw in the preceding section that the simulated path often differs from the actual one 
for most of the rules. Here, we ask whether our counterfactual experiment allows to rank the 
different fiscal rule proposals and hence to draw policy implications for the debate on the SGP 
reform.  
The following table summarizes the findings of the previous section, in terms of the 
different rules as compared with the benchmark. We focus on the period 1990-2002, because 
for the longer sample we only simulated the Maastricht and the balanced structural budget 
rules. 
 
Table 12. Differences between rules' simulations and benchmark (1990-2002) 
 France Germany Italy 
 Gap Rank Gap Rank Gap Rank 
Maastricht  (5.2) -0.40 5 0.13 2 -0.13 6 (5) 
Balanced structural budget  (5.3) -1.01 7 -0.36 5 -0.31 8 (7) 
Structural deficit convergence (5.4) 0.02 4 -0.38 6 -0.17 7 (6) 
1/2 point structural deficit 
 reduction (5.5) -0.58 6 -0.39 7 0.34 1 
Nominal Golden rule  (5.6) 0.64 1 0.45 1 0.25 2 
Structural Golden rule (5.6) 0.160 3 0.05 3 0.07 3 
Debt convergence  (5.7)     -0.12 5 
Relative Debt (5.8)  0.514 2 -0.08 4 -0.07 4 
Difference in average yearly values.  The reference section numbers are reported in parentheses
For Italy parentheses denote the ranking were the debt convergence rule not taken into account. 
 
A general result is the surprisingly large number of cases in which the simulated rules 
would have yielded a better outcome than the benchmark (positive differences). This may be 
explained of course by the deficit reduction efforts performed by all countries in the run-up to 
the euro, during the years considered. 
  
6.1 Country-by-Country Analysis 
We can first ask what rule would best fit each country taken in isolation. 
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France 
Table 12 tells us that the rule that would have yielded a higher output gain for France, 
over the period considered, is the nominal golden rule, i.e. a 3% ceiling for nominal deficit net 
of public net investment expenditures. On average, France would have gained almost two 
thirds of a point of GDP every year with respect to the benchmark simulation. The relative 
debt rule comes next, followed by the structural golden rule. The other structural deficit rules 
(convergence to zero, structural balance, and the half point yearly reduction) would all have 
yielded a loss of output with respect to the benchmark. In particular, the Commission proposal 
would cost almost six tenths of a point of GDP per year. The fact that all the proposals 
yielding a structural budget rule are so penalizing for France seems to suggest that its actual 
behaviour overlooked this aspect, to focus on nominal balance. 
 
Germany 
The ranking for Germany is quite similar. The best rule is also the nominal golden rule, 
and structural rules occupy the bottom of the ranking. The only minor difference is that the 
Maastricht rule, i.e. the current status quo, ranks high in Germany, contrary to France (where 
at any rate it is not among the worse alternatives).  
 
Italy 
Italy presents a somewhat different picture. Consistently with its peculiar debt situation, 
debt related rules seem quite costly in terms of GDP loss. On the other hand, quite 
surprisingly, the best rule would be the Commission proposal that, if applied since 1990, 
would have given an average of 0.34 points of GDP more than the benchmark. We can 
conclude that the strong effort performed by Italy in the 1990s involved a reduction in the 
structural budget that was more important than what the Commission proposes. On the other 
hand, structural convergence and balanced structural budget are in the last places of the 
ranking for Italy as for the other countries. 
 
6.2 Social Choice 
Ranking alternative rules by country constitutes little more than a curiosum, given the 
present institutional situation in Europe. In fact, the rules of the game are decided at the Union 
level, and need a consensus among governments. Thus, we need to evaluate the rules at a 
global level. 
 
A Global Welfare Approach 
First, we can ask what kind of rule maximizes the average welfare of the three countries. 
Table 13 reports the rules ranked according to two different but related criteria. The first, is 
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simply the average individual rank in the three countries. The second is the weighted average 
of the output gap differences reported in table 1215. 
 
Table 13. Global Welfare Maximizing Approach 
  Average rank Average output gap difference 
Nominal Golden rule  1.33 0.47 
Structural Golden rule  3.00 0.09 
Relative Debt    3.33 0.11 
Maastricht   4.33 -0.09 
1/2 Point structural deficit reduction  4.67 -0.29 
Structural deficit convergence  5.67 -0.21 
Balanced structural budget  6.67 -0.56 
The rank is a simple average; the output gap difference is weighted by GDP. 
 
As were to be expected by the single country cases, the global welfare maximizing rule is 
the nominal golden rule (twice first, one time second). Second comes the structural golden 
rule and the relative debt rule. The status quo, Maastricht, comes only at the fourth position 
entailing an average loss in output. The half point deficit reduction and structural deficit 
convergence precedes in ranking the other two options aiming at balancing the structural 
budget. 
 
A Consensus Approach 
The European decision making procedure, based on consensus and on veto power, makes 
another ranking interesting. In table 14 we adopted a sort of "minimax" approach. In fact rules 
were ordered by the lowest individual ranking. Such a procedure is the best fit to reflect the 
consensus spirit (such that a proposal preferred by all countries, except one that strongly 
opposes it, has lower chances of being adopted than a proposal that is second best for 
everyone). 
 
Table 14. Consensus Approach 
 Max Rank 
Countries 
 Blocking 
Nominal Golden rule 2 (Ita) 
Structural Golden rule 3 (Fra,Ger,Ita) 
Relative Debt 4 (Ger,Ita) 
Maastricht 6 (Ita) 
1/2 Point structural deficit reduction 7 (Ger) 
Structural deficit convergence 6 (Ger,Ita) 
Balanced structural budget 7 (Fra,Ita) 
 
                                            
15 The weights are given by the relative GDP in 2004 (Source: OECD, Main Economic Indicators), i.e. 0.21 
for Italy, 0.32 for France, 0.47 for Germany. 
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The result of this "consensus approach" is exactly the same than the welfare maximizing 
one. The nominal golden rule, first choice for Germany and France, and second choice for 
Italy, comes first by far. The Maastricht rule which comes second in Germany’s preferences is 
vetoed by the two other countries. The half point structural deficit reduction, which is first in 
Italy’s ranking, is vetoed by the two other countries.  
 
6.3 A "Growth Without Stability" Pact? 
This section compares the variance of the simulated output gap paths that emerge from 
our experiment. This is done in order to assess the stabilization properties of the different 
rules. A problem we encounter in such a statement is that a low variance is not necessarily an 
index of good economic performance; in fact, a stationary system has the lowest possible 
variance (i.e. zero). To avoid incurring in such a problem, we focussed, for each country, in 
the three proposals that ranked best in terms of average growth, and limited our analysis of 
stability to these cases (the others are available upon request). Table 15 gives a snapshot of 
the results. 
 
Table 15. Output Variability for the Best Performing Rules 
France Germany Italy 
Rule Var Rule Var Rule Var 
 Nominal Golden rule 0.47 Nominal Golden rule 1.37 1/2 point structural deficit reduction -0.67 
 Relative Debt 1.75 Maastricht  0.49 Nominal Golden rule -0.16 
 Structural Golden rule -0.05 Structural Golden rule -0.98 Structural Golden rule -0.26 
Difference from the variance of the benchmark 
 
From the table we can draw an important conclusion, namely that the Maastricht rule 
ranks quite low both in terms of growth and of stability. Moreover, structural rules are more 
efficient in stabilizing the output gap around its mean, since they allow for the full effect of 
automatic stabilisation.  In particular, the structural golden rule is the only one that guarantees 
lower variability than the benchmark for France and Germany, and comes after the 
Commission proposal for Italy. 
The second point that we want to stress is that the difference between the nominal and 
structural versions of the golden rule is particularly strong for Germany. This stems from the 
more important role that automatic stabilization plays in that country 
 
 
7. Robustness: An Alternative Measure of Welfare 
The conclusions of the previous section, namely the superiority of the golden rule over the 
other reform proposals, emerged quite clearly from our experiment. Nevertheless, the weak 
explanatory power of the base VAR regression of table 3 above requires results to be taken 
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cautiously, unless their robustness is somehow tested. Given the limited data available, we 
could not work on improving the fit of our base equations, so that we undertook a different 
approach. We carried on the same experiment of sections 5 and 6, but we substituted the 
output gap with unemployment as the dependent variable in the VAR. Then, we ran the same 
simulations as above and we looked at the ranking using cumulated unemployment  as a 
measure of welfare16. Table 16 summarizes our findings. 
 
Table 16. Rules ranked according to unemployment criterium     
  Country ranking 
 Fra Ger Ita 
Global Welfare Consensus
Structural Golden rule 2 2 3 2.33 3 
Nominal Golden rule 1 5 2 2.67 5 
Maastricht  4 1 4 3.00 4 
½ Point structural deficit reduction 7 4 1 4.00 7 
Relative Debt 3 6 5 4.67 6 
Balanced structural budget 5 2 7 4.67 7 
Structural deficit convergence 6 7 6 6.33 7 
1990-2002. Column 4 takes the average rank; column 5 takes the max rank. 
 
We can see that the superiority of the golden rule is confirmed in this different setting as 
well, even if in its structural rather than nominal form. The latter is penalized by its bad effect 
on the German economy, which affects only marginally its average ranking, but would 
seriously undermine its possibilities of being implemented in a consensus approach. The other 
difference is that the status quo, represented by the Maastricht rule, comes immediately after 
the two golden rules in terms of average ranking, and would even be the second preferred 
reform, if we used the consensus ranking. 
 
In spite of the methodological cautiousness that we invoked, we can highlight two results 
that emerge from our simulation exercises. 
(a) The first is that the golden rule emerges as the one that is less restrictive. This is true in 
the individual country's preferences and when using global criteria; in the global welfare 
case, as in the consensus case. If as a measure of welfare we use unemployment instead 
of the output gap, the preference goes to the structural rather than to the nominal version 
of the rule. Nevertheless, the main message remains unchanged. This result is even more 
interesting if we notice that our exercise focuses on the short term  effects of the rules, as 
we make no assumption in our simulations on how the potential of the economy evolves. 
If we had to consider the effects of public investment on potential growth, the conclusion 
in favour of the golden rule would probably be strengthened.  
                                            
16 The detailed results of the VAR estimation and of the simulations for each country are not reported for 
brevity, but are available upon request. 
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(b) In what concerns the existing framework, the Maastricht rule, the picture is less clear-cut. 
If we refer to the output gap, the status quo does not perform too brilliantly when 
compared to most of the alternatives currently being debated. For Germany individually, 
it is the second preferred alternative, but it ranks at best fifth for the two other countries. 
On the other hand, this result is not confirmed by our robustness test; on the contrary, 
when referring to unemployment, the Maastricht rule is second only to the structural 
golden rule. 
 
Thus, the lesson that we draw from our exercise is that if a reform proposal has a chance 
to be implemented in the near future, this might be some form of golden rule, since, as our 
simulations show quite robustly, it is the one more likely to catalyse consensus among the 
three large countries of the euro area. 
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